On November 28, 2011, Egyptians went to the polls to begin electing a new parliament in three stages. It was in many respects the first genuine democratic election ever to be held in the country. Yet a number of momentous institutional decisions remain to be made that may affect the direction of Egyptian politics and society for years to come. Many of these will be foundational constitutional questions about the relationship between religion and state, particularly the degree to which Islamic law will be the source of legislation. But Egypt must also settle on a method for electing its representatives, and the universe of electoral laws is quite large.
With the convening of the country’s first post-revolutionary parliament in late January 2012, Egypt’s troubled transition has entered a new phase. As the battle over Egypt’s future shifts from Tahrir Square to the newly elected People’s Assembly, Egyptians may be facing their most difficult challenges yet. The country’s interim rulers, the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF)—a 20-member body representing all four branches of the Egyptian military (similar to an expanded U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff)—have laid out an ambiguous and problematic roadmap. With presidential elections and the drafting of a new constitution scheduled to take place by July 1, the transition is imperiled by an ever-present threat of popular unrest as well as an economy teetering dangerously close to collapse. Yet, it is increasingly clear that the most formidable threat to Egyptian democracy comes from the ruling military council itself, through its manipulation of the political process, growing repression, and desire to remain above the law.
Meanwhile, recent events have reconfigured the delicate power balance among the country’s three main centers of power—the military, the Islamists, and those who started the January 2011 uprising. While the ruling military council retains its virtual monopoly on power, its legitimacy has been greatly eroded by its own gross mishandling of the transition. Recent elections handed the Islamists a decisive parliamentary majority, giving the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood an electoral mandate by which to challenge military rule. Meanwhile, the revolutionary youth groups that launched the uprising in Tahrir Square as well as other pro-democracy forces continue to be marginalized by regime repression and a political process that has passed them by.
While Egyptians and well-meaning outsiders continue to hope that recent elections will open the way for a better transition and facilitate the military’s exit from power, parliamentary politics alone may not be enough to reverse the damage done over the previous year or quell the revolutionary fervor simmering just beneath the surface. While a democratic outcome may still be possible in the long run, it will require major changes in how, and by whom, the transition is being managed.
The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and decisive. Where many other cases of mass atrocity crimes have failed to generate sufficient and timely political will to protect civilians at risk, the early response to Libya in 2011 has shown that the United Nations Security Council is able to give effect to the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm. While not an implementing party in a legal sense, the Australian government has taken a forward-leaning diplomatic stance in helping to mobilise broad support for addressing this crisis. In light of the ongoing political controversy over armed humanitarian intervention, the Libya case shows that state-based advocacy for R2P matters, given the on-going need to bolster the legitimacy of the principle. A discussion of Canberra’s diplomatic activity is a prelude to an examination of the proceedings of the UN Security Council and the two key resolutions, the second of which gave effect to the forcible action. The article then considers three dimensions of the Security Council’s implementation of the responsibility to protect: the language of the resolutions and the intriguing absence of a textual reference to the international community’s responsibility to act; the expansive mandate for civilian protection in Security Council resolution 1973; and the first unanimous referral to the International Criminal Court, with novel support from the United States of America.
Divided cities within contested states are a category in their own right, in that their division is driven by issues of national sovereignty as well as ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages. Reconstituting them as integrated urban spaces, therefore, requires policy shifts on many levels—local, municipal and state—but too often these are hampered by fears of loss of sovereignty and external domination. The case of Jerusalem in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a prime example of how national sovereignty issues can be seen as having an impact upon urban divisions. One option that is proposed for the resolution of this conflict, which has generated intense debate on both sides, is that of a binational Israeli-Palestinian state. This article argues that there is a false dichotomy concerning the competing benefits of binational and two-state models in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It contends, on the one hand, that the binational model comprises many forms, some of which are more confederal in structure. On the other hand, for the two state model to function effectively a high degree of interstate coordination is required which brings it close to some forms of confederalism. The article examines the discussions on divided Jerusalem to explore this argument and highlights the degree of interstate coordination that is required if any of the plans being put forward for the future of the city are to work. It concludes by relating the Jerusalem example to the wider issue of divided cities in contested states.
Previous attempts to explain US policy towards Iraq from 2003 onwards have understood US intentions and actions through a coherent, rational-utility-maximizing model of the state. This article seeks to de-centre this rationalist explanation by examining the ideational drivers that shaped the Bush administration’s understanding of Iraq and hence its policy towards the remaking of its post-invasion politics. In order to gain ideational coherence, both the Iraqi Ba’ath Party and the Sunni community were understood through a ‘diabolical enemy image’ schema. As a consequence, an ‘exclusive elite pact’ was constructed, a post-war political system specifically built to exclude former members of the Ba’ath Party and marginalize the participation of the Sunni community. This policy of exclusion drove the country into civil war. One side, Iraq’s new ruling elite, fought to impose a victor’s peace, the violent suppression of former members of the old regime. On the other, those excluded launched an insurgency to overturn the post-war political order.
Given the record of the US occupation and the profound limitations of America’s present stature, the Barack Obama administration is right to continue to draw down the American presence in Iraq. But in remembering the egregious mistakes of its predecessor the administration should not claim victory as it exits. It should not, as Vice President Joe Biden did in the midst of the de-Ba’athification crisis, claim all is well in Baghdad. A more honest and realistic approach would recognise the impossible legacy left by the Bush administration. The damage the previous administration did so much to encourage would then be minimised with the help of US allies and multilateral organisations. In short, after seven years of American occupation, it is time to go home.
This article argues that American policy towards Iraq went through four major shifts between the invasion in 2003 and the announcement of the surge in 2007. The best way to understand the Bush administration’s evolving policy towards Iraq is by examining the ideological parameters within which it was made. The article assesses various approaches to understanding the relationship between ideology, policy making and foreign policy, concluding that ideology shapes the paradigm and analytical categories within which foreign policy is made. A major change in foreign policy originates either from the decision-maker consciously recognizing and attempting to rework the ideational parameters within which policy is made or in reaction to ‘discrepant information’ or ‘anomalies’ that destabilize the paradigm and its analytical categories. The article goes on to examine the extent to which both neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism shaped George W. Bush’s foreign policy. It identifies a series of major analytical categories that originate from within these two doctrines and shaped policy towards Iraq. The article argues that the four major shifts in Bush’s policy towards Iraq were forced upon the administration by the rising tide of politically motivated violence. Ultimately this violence forced Bush to abandon the major analytical categories that, up to 2007, had given his policy coherence. In order to extricate his administration from the quagmire that Iraq had become by 2006, Bush totally transformed his approach, dropping the previously dominant neo-liberal paradigm and adopting a counter-insurgency doctrine.
The unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be the gravest long-term problem for the South Caucasus region and the whole area between the Black and Caspian Seas. Should the conflict re-ignite, it would spread catastrophe over a wide region, impacting not just Armenia and Azerbaijan, but Georgia, Russia, Turkey, Iran and energy routes across the Caspian Sea.
This article challenges the common assumption that the external actors involved in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) are driven either by neo-realist strategic competition or by the constraining power of domestic lobbies, or by a mixture of both. Such implicit assumptions are evident in the controversial argument of the power of the ‘Israel lobby’ as promoted by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. This article argues that approaches based on such assumptions fail to explain adequately the policies adopted not only by the United States, but also by other key external actors who have been historically engaged in the MEPP — the Soviet Union and the European Union. A better explanatory framework is provided by treating the MEPP as an institution and by applying a historical institutionalist approach to the development of the MEPP, using such concepts as critical junctures, path dependence and positive feedback to analyse how the main external actors involved in the MEPP came to adopt their distinctive national approaches to the peace process. In particular, it is the responses of these actors to certain critical junctures, most notably but not exclusively to the period of the 1967 and 1973 Arab– Israeli wars, that has had a particularly strong influence on policy formulation. For the US case, the creative policymaking of Henry Kissinger during the period after the 1973 war, which was subsequently incorporated into the US conceptualization of the MEPP, provides powerful and generally unrecognized insights into the initial puzzle identified by Walt and Mearsheimer — the consistent and almost unconditional support given to Israel by the United States despite the strategic problems this creates for broader US Middle East policy.
The political upheavals in the Arab world during 2011 have irrevocably transformed the Middle East. Yet, as the year draws to a close and the euphoria subsides, it is clear that comparisons of the ‘Arab spring’ to the end of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 were premature. There has been—and there will be—no serial collapse of authoritarian regimes leading to a democratic future. Instead of ‘revolution’, the talk now is of ‘uprising’, ‘revolt’ or even simply ‘crisis’. One reason for the disagreement on how to label the events of 2011 is the inclination to think of the ‘Arab world’ as a unified entity. Arab societies and polities do indeed have tight interconnections and share at least some important characteristics. The potent myth of the Arab nation and the common public space pervaded by the idea of ‘Arabism’ has had complex effects since the beginning of the modern state system in the Middle East. It has been cultivated by powerful media, such as the satellite television channel Al-Jazeera. The contagious nature of the uprisings that started in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to a number of other Arab states, helped by these media (among other factors), is confirmation that the component parts of the ‘Arab world’ are linked by strong internal bonds. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of ‘Arab’ events—or even an Arab event—may also constitute a set of blinkers. First, by compelling us to search for common trends and characteristics, it prevents us from seeing the profoundly different causes, contexts and outcomes of the developments of 2011—from seeing that each uprising was different, focused on domestic, national issues and comprehensible in its own light. Second, it stops us from placing these developments in other, possibly equally relevant, contexts of crisis and contestation. One such context could be the Mediterranean and more widely European—even global—protests which also unfolded in 2011. Another is the Middle Eastern context, which would locate the Arab uprisings alongside the post-2009 Green movement in Iran. Although the Arab framework is important, other perspectives can also yield invaluable insights.
The Arab countries straddle the lifelines of world trade. They link Europe to Asia and, with Iran, surround the Persian Gulf home to some 54 percent of global oil reserves. The region’s many international and domestic disputes, as well as restraints on political expression and human rights, have spawned extremism. In turn, the region’s endemic instability or perceived risk of instability has provided cover for some of the world’s most authoritarian and corrupt regimes. Until the turn of this year, the Arab countries had almost uniformly resisted the process of democratization that swept up other regions in recent decades. The series of popular revolts known as the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in the last weeks of 2010, has already wrought more change in six months than the region had seen in almost 60 years and there is more to come. Whether or not the Arab peoples’ aspirations for dignity and voice are fulfilled, and how smoothly transitions to democracy proceed, are not just great moral questions they will also determine the region’s stability and its economic prospects for decades to come. At the same time, getting on a path of sound economic growth will greatly enhance the chances that transitions to democracy succeed.
To establish even a marginally functioning economy out of the wreckage of Iraq would have been a daunting task. Despite decades of a heavily controlled, state-run economy; the deterioration caused by a succession of wars; a decade of international sanctions; and the looting and sabotage that followed the 2003 war, the U.S. government set its sights high after toppling Saddam Hussein: to create a liberal, market-based Iraqi economy, a key piece of its broader goal to bring democracy to Iraq.
Within the broader debate over the political economy of statebuilding, the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in fragile and post-conflict settings is increasingly controversial but still understudied. This paper examines the tensions between the good governance agenda currently being implemented in Iraq and the investment dynamics occurring at the country’s national and provincial levels. Drawing on disaggregated data, the paper argues that the flow of FDI is reinforcing destabilizing dynamics in Iraq by increasing levels of inequality, deepening the decentralization process, and undermining internal and external balances of power.
Focusing on British involvement in the 1960s Yemen Civil War, this article examines the centralised mechanisms developed in Whitehall to coordinate covert action interdepartmentally. It therefore sheds new light on London’s security and intelligence machine and its input into clandestine operations. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews, it uncovers various important but secretive actors, which have been overlooked or misunderstood in the existing literature, and outlines their functions in the most detail yet available. In doing so, it considers how these bodies evolved in relation to competing threat assessments of the local situation and the impact they had on Britain’s covert intervention in the theatre. This article assesses the utility of the system and argues that it provided an effective means to ensure that any covert action sanctioned was properly scrutinised so as to reduce risks and best meet national interests.
The participation of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) security agencies in the armed struggle against Israel in the second Palestinian uprising (2000–2005) is analyzed in this article as a response to the demand of Palestinian society, thus as a unique case of armed forces which, in the lack of political directive, became more attentive to public opinion. The article shows how Palestinian public discourse in the late 1990s–early 2000s, that was shaped by the Islamic movement of Hamas, portrayed the PA’s security officials as traitors. Members of the PA security agencies (mainly Fatah members) sought to reposition themselves in the “national camp,” and this motivated them to raise their weapons against Israeli targets. By doing so, they also removed the mental burden of turning their weapons against fellow Palestinians that was one of the major sources for their image as collaborators.
Throughout the Middle East, Islamists, leftists, and other ideological streams are forming coalitions in opposition to their authoritarian regimes. Yet little research has been conducted on the conditions under which these cross-ideological coalitions fail or succeed. Three cases of successful coalition building and one case of failed coalition building in Jordan indicate that cross-ideological coalitions are initiated in the context of external threat and facilitated by organizational forms that ensure the members gain or maintain their ability to pursue their independent goals. Most important, in contrast to other studies, these cases show that the plentifulness of recruits impedes cooperation. Rather than alleviating competition, an abundance of potential recruits increases competition and hinders cross-ideological cooperation.
The two volumes of Understanding Civil War build upon the World Bank’s prior research on conflict and violence, particularly on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, whose model of civil war onset has sparked much discussion on the relationship between conflict and development in what came to be known as the “greed” versus “grievance” debate. The authors systematically apply the Collier-Hoeffler model to 15 countries in 6 different regions of the world, using a comparative case study methodology to revise and expand upon economic models of civil war. (The countries selected are Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Sudan, Algeria, Mali, Senegal, Indonesia, Lebanon, Russian Federation, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Caucasus.) The book concludes that the “greed” versus “grievance” debate should be abandoned for a more complex model that considers greed and grievance as inextricably fused motives for civil war.
The two volumes of Understanding Civil War build upon the World Bank’s prior research on conflict and violence, particularly on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, whose model of civil war onset has sparked much discussion on the relationship between conflict and development in what came to be known as the “greed” versus “grievance” debate. The authors systematically apply the Collier-Hoeffler model to 15 countries in 6 different regions of the world, using a comparative case study methodology to revise and expand upon economic models of civil war. (The countries selected are Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Sudan, Algeria, Mali, Senegal, Indonesia, Lebanon, Russian Federation, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Caucasus.) The book concludes that the “greed” versus “grievance” debate should be abandoned for a more complex model that considers greed and grievance as inextricably fused motives for civil war.
How useful is the concept of patrimonialism to analyze state formation and political dynamics in postcolonial nation-states? Using Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq during critical periods of state-building following the end of colonial rule, the author considers this question. The purpose of the article is to build on Max Weber by exploring how patrimonialism operates in kin-based social contexts where power on the basis of kinship ties is exerted not only by a central authority but also by leaders of local communities organized along lines of real or fictive kinship—as was the case in the three countries in the period under examination. Suggesting that Weber undertheorized the way in which central authority relates to local collectivities in his analysis of patrimonialism, the author identifies three patterns in the strategies used by central power toward local patrimonial networks: marginalization, integration, and shifts between marginalization and integration. The article argues that central patrimonialism can be accommodated with all three strategies directed toward local patrimonialism.
I n July 2009, the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) facilitated a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to capture the experiences of USDA agricultural advisors deployed to ministries and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The discussions yielded numerous individual observations, insights, and potential lessons from the work of these advisors on PRTs in these countries. This article presents a broad overview of the challenges identified by the conference participants and highlights key recommendations generated as a result of suggestions and comments made at the workshop. The workshop was intended to capture insights and lessons from the !eld to develop recommendations for improvements in PRT operations, with a particular focus on agricultural development. The 30 participants came from a broad spectrum of USDA: the National Resources Conservation Service, Food Safety and Inspection Service, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Marketing Service, and the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration. To focus the agenda, CCO and USDA designed a preworkshop survey administered to the 30 USDA returnees (22 from Iraq and 8 from Afghanistan). After receiving 24 responses, CCO and USDA used the results to develop an agenda built around facilitated group discussions in four areas: doctrine and guidance, civil-military cooperation and command and control relationships, projects and their impact on the host nation, and administrative issues.
The past two decades have seen international agencies pay closer attention to the relationship between conflict and development. An example of this is the UNDP and its conflict-related development analysis (CDA), which aims to identify the causes of conflict and design measures that will enhance development while reducing conflict. Through the case study of the CDA’s application in the occupied Palestinian territory, the article reveals its main limitations including an emphasis on conflict management (as opposed to conflict reduction), the choice of (neo-liberal) development model, prioritisation of particular partners over others (i.e. ‘state’ over non-state) and an erroneous assumption of neutrality. These have become manifested into the UNDP’s current programme for action which undermines its own stated objectives, to work ‘on’ the causes of conflict rather than ‘in’ or ‘around’ conflict. The UNDP’s experience therefore has important lessons for the use of conflict analysis and policy design elsewhere.
This paper compares two sets of US-led postwar reconstruction strategies: the Reverse Course in Japan after World War II and the New Way Forward in Iraq in 2007 and 2008. Relying on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of power, the article argues that in the wake of military victory in Japan and Iraq, the US attempted to found a new historical bloc in the occupied countries, a historical bloc centred on capitalism as a mode of production and US ideas and values as the ideological cement coalescing the Japanese and Iraqi population and elite around the US project. The paper contends that consistency of action between reconstruction policies, and between reconstruction policies and regional and global foreign policies, is the key to the efficiency of postwar reconstruction projects. Consistency of action refers to the maximisation of power resources and to their use in a coherent way; that is avoiding opposition and favouring complementarities between means of power used. Such consistency was achieved in Japan while its attainment in Iraq is less obvious
One of the underlying assumptions of the contemporary debate over Afghanistan is that counterterrorism objectives can be achieved through counterinsurgency methods. The recent decision by President Barack Obama to deploy 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan is premised on the idea that to disrupt Al Qaeda and prevent it from forming training camps in Afghanistan it will be necessary to first reverse the momentum of the Taleban insurgency. This approach—which places the US and UK on the offensive to disrupt terrorist plots before they arrive on their shores—assumes that the threats from Al Qaeda and the Taleban are intertwined and thus the strategy of response must seamlessly comprise elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. In fact, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are very different—often contradictory—models of warfare, each with its own associated assumptions regarding the role of force, the importance of winning support among the local population, and the necessity of building strong and representative government. Rather than being mutually reinforcing, they may impose tradeoffs on each other, as counterterrorism activities may blunt the effectiveness of counterinsurgency approaches and vice versa. The last four years in Afghanistan provide evidence that when employed in the same theatre counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies can offset one another. To be in a position to begin the withdrawal of US troops before July 2011, the Obama administration will need to find a way to manage the tradeoffs between its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan.
The aim of this article is to shed light on the distinctive role of the EU in Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) and examine how SSR has contributed to the overall state-building project. Following the Oslo Accords, the EU engaged actively in the state-building project in the OPTs taking a number of initiatives on the ground. Since then security has been a key issue in all Israeli–Palestinian agreements and has also became synonymous with Palestinian statehood. The article draws upon literature on state-building and SSR and its central aim is to examine the distinctive initiatives that the EU has taken in order to help the Palestinian Authority (PA) reform both its security and judiciary sector as part of its broader state-building strategy towards the OPTs, as well as provide explanations on why these policies had limited impact.
It is uncontroversial that the invasion and occupation of Iraq involved the following errors: the misinterpretation of intelligence; the underestimation of the number of troops requisite for law and order; the disbanding of the Iraqi army; and indiscriminate debaathification of the civil service. The first error was one of imagination rather than virtue; the others were caused by ‘callousness”, impatience, and consequent imprudence. These vices were partly responsible for massive civilian casualties, which many wrongly assume to teach the fundamentally erroneous character of the invasion. Nonetheless, we should beware such moral flaws in tomorrow’s policy-makers and renounce the managerial mentality that fosters them.
Another lesson is that, in so far as nation-rebuilding requires substantial and long-term commitments, it must command the support of the nation-builder’s domestic electorate; and to do that, it must be able to justify itself in terms of the national interest. From this we should not infer the further lesson that morality’s reach into foreign policy is limited, since, according to Thomist ethics, the pursuit of the national interest can itself be moral.
Finally, one lesson that we should not learn from Iraq is never again to violate the letter of international law and intervene militarily in a sovereign state without Security Council authorization. The law’s authority can be undermined as much by the UN’s failure to enforce it, as by states taking it into their own hands. It is seriously problematic that the current international legal system denies the right of individual states to use military force unilaterally except in self-defence, while reserving the enforcement of international law to a body, whose capacity to act is hamstrung by the right of veto. Given this situation, military intervention without Security Council authorization could be morally justified on certain conditions.
Outside intervention in civil warfare is important for humanitarian, theoretical, and practical policy reasons—since 2006, much of the debate over the war in Iraq has turned on the danger of external intervention if the United States were to withdraw. Yet, the literature on intervention has been compartmented in ways that have made it theoretically incomplete and unsuitable as a guide to policy. We therefore integrate and expand upon the theoretical and empirical work on intervention and apply the results to the policy debate over the US presence in Iraq using a Monte Carlo simulation to build upon the dyadic results of probit analysis. We find that Iraq is, in fact, a significantly intervention-prone conflict in an empirical context; the prospect of a wider, regional war in the event that violence returns in the aftermath of US withdrawal cannot safely be ignored.
This article extends the formal logic of Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence to account for three political actors with asymmetric capabilities. In contrast to Kalyvas’ theory, the authors’ computer simulation suggests that (1) selective violence by the stronger actor will be concentrated in areas where weaker actors exercise control; (2) the relative level of selective violence used by weaker actors will be lower because of a reduced capacity to induce civilian collaboration; and (3) areas of parity among the three actors will exhibit low levels of selective violence perpetrated primarily by the strongest actor. Results from a logistic regression, using empirical data on Israel and two rival Palestinian factions from 2006 to 2008, are consistent with these predictions: Israel was more likely to use selective violence in areas largely controlled by Palestinian factions; zones of incomplete Israeli control were not prone to selective violence; and zones of mixed control witnessed moderate levels of selective violence, mainly by Israel. Nonetheless, Palestinian violence remained consistent with Kalyvas’ predictions.
Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies. The authors test that prediction in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces and (2) violence that kill civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, the data emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces (p < .05 percent). There is no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. The authors identify several potential explanations, introducing the notion of insurgent precision to adjudicate between the possibilities that predation on one hand, and security measures and information costs on the other, account for the negative correlation between unemployment and violence in these three conflicts.
From 2007 to 2008, Iraq’s tribal “Sahwa” (Arabic for “Awakening”) was a key component of the U.S. “surge” strategy and largely credited for its role in the dramatic reduction of violence across the country. In the last two years, though, members of the movement have increasingly become the target of a retaliation campaign led by al-Qaeda’s “Islamic State of Iraq” and other insurgent groups still active on the battlefield, with almost daily assassinations and attacks in which hundreds have died. In the present context of resurgent violence, persistent political tensions triggered by the 2010 stalemate and the U.S. military’s scheduled withdrawal of its remaining troops by the end of 2011, the Sahwa’s future looms as one of the most crucial tests of Iraq’s stabilization and successful “democratic” transition. Concerns over the fate of the movement also come amid the growing alienation of its members from a government that has overall failed to incorporate them into its new security apparatus. While U.S. officials might continue to downplay this scenario, reliable sources indicate that a number of Sahwa fighters have already flipped back into armed struggle, including within the ranks of their erstwhile nemesis, al-Qaeda.
Building on my own extensive research, this article seeks to analyze a worrying trend and shed new light on the complex nature of the Sahwa since its appearance on the Iraqi scene. It first attempts to highlight the multiple reasons for the movement’s gradual downfall, especially following the U.S. military drawdown in the summer of 2009, with specific focus on the motives likely to have incited some of its members to revert to al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups. The second part emphasizes aspects of continuity linking the Sahwa’s recent evolution to the more historical transformations of Iraqi tribalism. It attempts to show, more particularly, how Iraq’s tribal structures have undergone a continuing dynamic of “subversion” that actually preceded the establishment of Iraq’s modern state. The last part underlines why U.S. policy makers should draw serious lessons from the movement’s experiment, in particular why “tribal engagement” strategies in conflict configurations, even when bringing short-term security gains, should not be used at the expense of genuine state- and nation-building efforts.
The “Arab Spring” has proven astonishing and exhilarating to Middle East analysts and activists alike. Starting in Tunisia and spreading quickly to Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Syria and beyond, a wave of political protest, unprecedented in scope and ambition, swept the region in 2011. In short order, two deeply entrenched authoritarian rulers were jettisoned from office, and by early summer the leaders of at least three other Arab regimes appeared to be in grave jeopardy. In the wake of this wave, nearly every authoritarian regime in the region scrambled to concoct the “right” mix of repression and cooptation in the hope of stemming the protest. And even authoritarian regimes as distant as China took nervous notice of developments in the region. For Middle East specialists, the events of the Arab Spring proved especially jarring, even if welcomed, because of their extensive investment in analyzing the underpinnings of authoritarian persistence, long the region’s political hallmark. The empirical surprise of 2011 raises a pressing question—do we need to rethink the logic of authoritarianism in the Arab world or, even more broadly, authoritarian persistence writ large?
This note, summarizing the analysis and recommendations of an upcoming CPR Working Paper of the same title, looks at issues related to financing modalities and aid management arrangements in post-conflict situations. It makes a number of recommendations based on a review of several recent case studies, of which four are assessed in detail: West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, and Afghanistan. It focuses on the lessons of experience on multi-donor trust funds and on the recipient government’s aid management architecture in post-conflict settings. This paper is concerned with the specific issues of financing modalities and aid management arrangements in post-conflict situations, and advances a number of recommendations on the basis of a review of several recent cases, among which four are assessed in detail: West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor (Timor-Leste) and Afghanistan. While generally applicable recommendations do emerge from the review, the most important recommendation is to tailor the design and sequencing of financing and aid coordination to the circumstances of the specific case.
The democratic uprisings and consequent turmoil in the Arab world during the last 18 months have had significant impact on the geostrategic situation in the Middle East as well as on the policies of major regional and global powers. As the upheavals continue to unfold, especially in strategically important countries such as Syria and Bahrain, they will continue to have a major impact on intraregional politics as well as great-power interests.
This article considers the relationship between two processes—conflict resolution and counterterrorism—which conceptually share many common points, yet in practice do not necessarily proceed together easily towards a common goal. Considering particular cases of ethnic conflict in which terrorist factions exist, the article argues that while neither conflict resolution nor counterterrorism alone can adequately address the problem, simultaneously conducting both must keep in mind the processes’ inherent differences and avoid excessive prioritizing of one over the other. By exploring recent Turkish governmental initiatives to address the Kurdish question, the article attempts to provide an outline for how to successfully cope with the two processes simultaneously.
Containment has been salient in intellectual and policy debates for 60 years. It informed US foreign policy towards the USSR and, later, the so-called rogue states. The endurance of containment beyond the Cold War suggests that it possesses the quality of transferability, the capacity of a grand strategy from the past to transcend the circumstances that gave rise to it, to suggest what should be emulated and what avoided in future policies. Drawing on the notion of transferability and on the method of structured, focused comparison, this article uses Israel’s foreign policy towards Hezbollah and Hamas to argue that containment is transferable from the state level to a state/territorial transnational actor (TNA) relationship, albeit with permutations. This argument is examined in relation to four issues: the circumstances under which containment arises; its applicability to territorial TNA; the objectives sought by implementing containment; and the role of legitimacy as a component of containment. In so doing the article seeks to make a contribution to the debate on containment. While there is a rich literature on state containment, research on containing territorial TNA has been extremely limited.
The current struggle to define the basic contours of Iraq’s political system pits those who support a loose federal arrangement against advocates of a return to centralized rule. Increasingly, this struggle is being defined in ethnic terms, with (mainly) Kurds defending the constitutional status quo against concerted efforts on the part of (Arab) Iraqi nationalists to reconfigure the balance of power between the center and the regions. The March 2010 election seems certain to strengthen the latter at the expense of the former. This paper outlines an alternative approach to Iraq’s federalism dilemma. Using the exemplar case of the Åland Islands, it is argued that a strongly centralized Arab Iraq is not inherently incompatible with an autonomous Kurdistan Region, and that by anchoring the Kurds’ autonomous status in international law, a destructive descent towards violent ethnic conflict can be avoided.
Judging by the popular press, in January 2011 Twitter and Facebook went from being simply engaging social diversions to become engines of political change that upended decades of Arab authoritarianism. It is tempting to be swept away by this narrative, which suggests that social media prompted hundreds of thousands, and then millions, of Tunisians and Egyptians to pour into the streets and peacefully demand change. Brittle authoritarian regimes had little choice but to comply, and in this way, social media irrevocably changed the future of the Middle East. Following the logic to its conclusion, it would suggest that the Middle East is on the brink of a period of democratic consolidation, as the ideals and tools of revolutionaries lead the region forward into a period of anti-sectarianism, liberalism, and hope.
The world breathed a sigh of relief at the announcement of a new Iraqi government on 21 December 2010. After nine months of wrangling following the 7 March elections, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki finally engineered a deal that kept him in place at the head of a 42-person cabinet. Maliki was unable to name a full coterie of ministers; ten of the portfolios, including the main security ministries, are being managed on a temporary basis by other ministers until permanent nominations are made. Nevertheless, approval of the cabinet brought to an end a crisis that left the political system in limbo and saw a deterioration of the security situation.
But now the deed is done, a much bigger question looms: will the government be able to manage Iraq, stabilise the country further and heal the internal divisions that threaten its long-term security?
The ‘oil question’ in Iraq has traditionally been viewed almost exclusively through the prism of ethno-sectarianism. Disputes over the management and licensing of the hydrocarbon sector and over revenue distribution have been seen as a battle for power between Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian communities, as if these were monolithic entities. This has led to a conviction—especially among US policy-makers in post-war Iraq—that solving the problem lies in a simple formula of apportioning control of the sector to decentralized authorities and dividing revenue proportionally. This view ignores the fact that disagreements over management of the sector and over revenue distribution reflect a deeper dispute that cuts across ethno-sectarian lines. In reality, disputes are driven far more by the as-yet-unresolved issue of whether ultimate sovereign authority in Iraq lies with the central government or should be decentralized to regional and provincial governments. As the main source of revenue in Iraq, control over the oil and gas sector is critical to the success of these rival agendas. Consequently, compromise has been impossible to achieve, and neither side is willing to make concessions for fear of threatening their long-term ambitions.
Tactical maneuvering by different parties in the aftermath of the recent elections may provide some temporary respite to the oil and gas dispute, as Arab leaders in Baghdad seek to co-opt the support of Kurdish parties to form a new coalition government. But an accommodation over the federalism question in Iraq still seems out of reach. This will not only hamper the legislative process and effective government in the coming years, but could also threaten stability, particularly along the fragile border that separates the Kurdistan Region from the rest of Iraq.
This article uses a sequential mixed method approach to examine the origins and persistence of paramilitaries and state-sponsored militias in the developing world. Combining comparative case studies of Southeast Asia and the Middle East with statistical analysis, it shows that revolutionary decolonization produces more decentralized and localized force structures, while direct inheritance of colonial armies leads to more conventional force structures. Subsequently, the level of competition within the regional system influences whether a state can persist in the use of paramilitaries or must transition to a more centralized, conventional force.
This article compares the debates and demonstrations about Darfur that have taken place in the Sudan, the United States, and Qatar and illuminates how political violence is apprehended and cultural identities are constructed. The rallies that occurred among Sudanese inside and outside the Sudan following the 2009 indictment of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) are particularly revealing. Examining what has been represented worldwide as the first genocide of the twenty-first century brings to light the ideologies that are expressed in impassioned political positions. Ideology, which implicitly undergirds the mixed emotions with which the ICC warrant was received, has been fundamental to the Darfur story from the start of the crisis in 2003. Describing Darfur in three distinct sociopolitical arenas, one sees various scenarios that are akin to a play with multiple actors and scenes, each of which is contextually mediated and expertly produced. The disconnections, ruptures, and shifts in the flow of this narration point to the disparities in the situational, local, regional, and transnational forces at work.
This supplement is an update of Progress or Peril?, using the methodology developed in that report. The methodology involves blending four different source types: media, public (official), polls, and interviews. The PCR Project was not able to conduct interviews in Iraq for this supplement; the findings in this report are based on 279 data points drawn from media, public sources, and polling, covering the period August-October 2004. We collected 115 media points, 134 points from public and official sources, and 30 polling points, which were weighted equally in our overall graphs. The citations used in this report represent a fraction of the information the Project examined for this analysis. The data suggest the following findings: 1. Iraq has still not passed the tipping point, as defined in Progress or Peril, in any of the five sectors of reconstruction reviewed. 2. Iraq’s reconstruction continues to stagnate; it is not yet moving on a sustained positive trajectory toward the tipping point or end-state in any of those sectors. Within the areas of security, governance and participation, economic opportunity, services, and social well-being, there has been little overall positive or negative movement; there has, however, been some regression or progress within particular indicators reviewed, as described below. The health care sector has seen the most dramatic decline over the past few months.
This book explores the contradictions that emerge in international statebuilding efforts in war-torn societies. Since the end of the Cold War, more than 20 major peace operations have been deployed to countries emerging from internal conflicts. This book argues that international efforts to construct effective, legitimate governmental structures in these countries are necessary but fraught with contradictions and vexing dilemmas. Drawing on the latest scholarly research on postwar peace operations, the volume: adresses cutting-edge issues of statebuilding including coordination, local ownership, security, elections, constitution making, and delivery of development aid; features contributions by leading and up-and-coming scholars; provides empirical case studies including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and others; presents policy-relevant findings of use to students and policy makers alike.
In the context of the Global War on Terrorism and modern counterinsurgency operations, the Department of Defense and other agencies within the U.S. government utilize an unprecedented number of private contractors to support missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.These contractors are vital to counterinsurgency efforts because they augment force limitations by performing services ranging from logistics support to security functions. However, unlike members of the Armed Forces who are “accountable under [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] wherever they are located,” private security contractors fall into “legal ‘gray areas”’ between host-nation laws, domestic criminal laws, and international laws such as the Geneva Convention. As civilians, they would normally be subject to host-nation laws. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, contractors are expressly protected by agreements providing immunity from prosecution in the local jurisdiction. In addition, although Congress passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”) to hold civilians accountable under domestic criminal laws, MEJA has not been widely utilized due to significant resource limitations. Finally, contractors do not “fit the formal definition of mercenaries” and are thus “undefined by international law.” While perhaps well intended, section 552 raises many questions. One of the most important questions concerns the constitutionality of section 552. On one hand, numerous federal court decisions have upheld military convictions of civilians accompanying the force during times of declared war. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has declared that subjecting civilians to the UCMJ in peacetime is unconstitutional. As such, the question of whether the UCMJ can be constitutionally applied to civilian contractors during contingency operations, which fall between war and peace, remains unanswered. This Recent Development will argue that, although there are significant due process barriers to constitutionality, these concerns do not completely rule out the possibility of applying the UCMJ to civilian contractors accompanying the force in contingency operations.
This article examines international interventions in the aftermath of civil wars to see whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when they are absent. Because peacekeeping is not applied to cases at random, I first address the question of where international personnel tend to be deployed. I then attempt to control for factors that might affect both the likelihood of peacekeepers being sent and the ease or difficulty of maintaining peace so as to avoid spurious findings. I find, in a nutshell, that peacekeeping after civil wars does indeed make an important contribution to the stability of peace.
This book examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn’t. Authors argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertakien by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN’s role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.
A wide range of activities were carried out by UNEP in Iraq between 2003 and 2006, primarily through the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) based in Geneva, Switzerland, and the International Environmental Technology Centre (IETC) based in Osaka and Shiga, Japan. Many activities continued into 2007 and beyond. This report is an up-to-date compilation of the various activities undertaken by UNEP in Iraq between 2003 and 2006. Its objectives are the following:
1. To provide a complete description of the various activities undertaken by UNEP in Iraq between 2003 and 2006;
2. To make an objective assessment of the impacts of UNEP’s intervention; and
3. To document the lessons learned by UNEP in implementing activities in a complex situation such as Iraq.
In April 2003, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) published a Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq, which outlined the environmental vulnerabilities resulting from years of conflict in the country, the low priority given to environment by the previous regime, and the
unintended environmental effects of international economic sanctions in the 1990s. One of the issues identified in the study was the impact of the use of depleted uranium (DU) during the conflict. The report accordingly recommended that a comprehensive field assessment be conducted in Iraq to investigate the use of DU and its residual impacts. UNEP’s original plan called for the deployment of international experts to Iraq to conduct the investigation. However in June 2005, due to the continuously deteriorating security situation, UNEP decided instead to train and equip national experts from the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC) of the Iraqi Ministry of Environment (MoEn) to undertake the expert DU assessment locally. This report focuses on the various capacity-building activities carried out by UNEP to ensure good quality procedures during the local expert DU assessment and subsequent fieldwork. A second report presenting the findings and conclusions of
the fieldwork will be published in 2007.
The recent conflict in Lebanon and in Israel, which began in July 2006 and lasted for more than a month led to nearly one million Lebanese – over to a quarter of the total population – fleeing their homes. This massive human displacement and destruction or severe damage of approximately 30, 000 housing units clearly had a very deep impact on the civilian population. Within hours of the ceasefire on 14 August, large numbers began returning home—a measure of the resilience of the Lebanese people but also representing a huge challenge for the aid workers trying to deal with the flood of returnees. Removal of the huge amount of rubble generated by the conflict represented a further challenge but one that got underway surprisingly quickly and, aspart of the reconstruction work, is on-going. One of the most high profile issues of the conflict was the bombing of the Jiyeh power plant which resulted in the spillage of thousands of tones of oil into the Mediterranean Sea. On 5 August, the Minister of Environment of the Lebanon formally requested UNEP to conduct a post-conflict environmental assessment of his country.Thescope of UNEP’s assessment work was geographically limited to Lebanon.
The findings are presented in this report. Coastal communities have been severely affected by the oil pollution washed onto their shores. During and in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the international community (including governments and regional organizations) and the Lebanese government worked tirelessly alongside local civil society organizations in a massive effort to contain the oil spill and implement clean-up measures along the Lebanese coast.
The Iraqi Ministry of Environment (MoEn), which stemmed from and incorporated the Ministry of Health’s former Environmental Protection and Improvement Directorate, was established in September 2003. Since its inception, the Ministry has operated under four different governments, with three different ministers. In spite of this political flux, security constraints and resource limitations, the Ministry has succeeded in establishing its presence, training its staff, improving infrastructure and carrying out a number of projects. UNEP initiated this institutional assessment of the Ministry of Environment as part of its project for Strengthening Environmental Governance in Iraq, which is funded by the Government of Japan through the Iraq Trust Fund. Ministry officials undertook the fieldwork, and UNEP provided technical assistance. The assessment found the Iraqi Ministry of Environment to be fully operational, with competent staff and functioning legislation. While its work covers all areas of environmental management, including law-making and law enforcement, the Ministry’s core strength is in environmental monitoring, due to its historical background as the monitoring arm of the Ministry of Health. These three roles should in future be segregated, and the law-making and inspection capabilities reinforced. The Ministry is currently working on both these issues. In addition, a new framework law on the environment is being developed, which should be followed by a new set of standards and regulations. The Ministry is also being reorganized to better carry out its current mandate. Once these activities are completed, the law-making and enforcement components can be strengthened.
UNEP’s intention in conducting the assessment was not to assign blame, but to present an accurate picture of the state of environmental affairs. UNEP will further actively share the findings and recommendations of this report with donors who have an interest in future environmental projects in the region.There was no real precedent for an assessment of this nature. UNEP developed its own methods, focusing on four objectives: First, to gather a baseline data set of the environment in the disengaged settlements. Second, to identify areas posing immediate risk to people. Third, to create an information base, including satellite images and maps, for future planning. Fourth, to provide training on environmental assessments to Palestinian experts. Using satellite imagery, reports and comments from Israeli, Palestinian and international sources, UNEP scientists – prior to commencement of the field work – identified approximately 100 areas of interest, including industrial buildings, waste disposal sites, agricultural plants and storage tanks. The field work was carried out in Gaza from 9-18 December 2005 by a UNEP team of 8 experts with expertise in the fields of hazardous waste, including asbestos, marine and coastal issues, soil contamination and water quality. The UNEP team was consequently able to cover all 21 disengaged settlements, as well as the Erez industrial site. Following the field work, samples were produced in triplicate, handed to the Palestinian and Israeli laboratories and sent to an independent, UNEP contracted laboratory in the UK.
This report presents the findings of the survey. Other than some localized pollution, the former Israeli settlements did not cause contamination of water, land or buildings posing a significant risk to the environment or to public health. Pollution at the former Erez Industrial Estate was also localized and could be mitigated by targeted clean-up action. The study thus finds that overall the environmental impact of the former Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip was limited – welcome news for everyone concerned with the region’s environment, long-term stability and economic progress. We hope that the findings presented in this report would bolster Palestinian resettlement plans and foster hopes for economic investment and peace in the region.
As major military operations in Iraq were drawing towards an end in late April 2003, UNEP published its Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq, aimed at providing a timely overview of key environmental issues in the context of the recent conflict. Background materials used in the report’s preparation relied on UNEP’s earlier work in the region, including three studies it had carried out about the environmental impacts of the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2001 report on the demise of the Mesopotamian Marshlands. Due to the conflict situation, it was not possible to conduct field assessments and the study was rapidly compiled from published and online information sources as well as satellite data. Despite these limitations, the report sets out the general environmental context and provides guidance on the next steps for addressing key environmental challenges. UNEP’s Desk Study was prepared as part of the overall ‘UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal for Iraq’, launched in March 2003.
This Progress Report should not be considered as a substitute for the Iraq Desk Study, but is intended to provide updated information about the evolving environmental situation in Iraq, with a view to highlighting priority areas for action. In addition to other sources, it draws its information from two fact-finding missions that UNEP was able to field to Iraq in July and August 2003. Unfortunately, however, the security front remains unstable, seriously curtailing the United Nations margin of manoeuvre in Iraq. The Progress Report also makes use of background material collected for the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) / World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, which will be presented at the International Donors’ Conference in Madrid on 24 October 2003. Within the UNDG process, UNEP has been mandated to identify and evaluate environmental concerns; one of the four cross-cutting sectors of the Iraq Needs Assessment. This has provided an opportunity for UNEP to actively link environmental activities with other relevant sectors such as agriculture, water and sanitation, energy, housing and institutions.
Every conflict generates risks to human health and to the environment. The post-conflict situation in Iraq compounds a range of chronic environmental issues, and presents immediate challenges in the fields of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and administration.
Now that major military combat operations have ended, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is addressing post-conflict risks to the environment and to human health, and promoting long-term environmental management. Timeliness is paramount. Lessons learned from earlier conflicts show that the immediate environmental consequences must be addressed as soon as possible to avoid a further deterioration of humanitarian and environmental conditions. For this reason, UNEP, as a part of the wider UN family, integrated its post-conflict activities into the UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal launch on 28 March 2003.
Earlier UNEP post-conflict studies also demonstrate that the environment can have major implications for human livelihoods and for sustainable economic development. As such, environmental issues must be integrated across all sectors in post-conflict situations. Following
this most recent conflict, Iraqi citizens may have fears about environmental threats from military activities, such as air pollution, drinking water contamination, and the presence of hazardous substances, including heavy metals and depleted uranium. Objective and reliable information will help set aside such fears where the risk is minimal, and will help to target measurement and clean up activities in areas where the risk is higher. For these reasons, and based on this study and the information currently emerging from Iraq, UNEP is recommending that field research and analysis be carried out in Iraq at the earliest possible time. The approach of this Desk Study is environmental and technical. The intent is not to attach blame for various environmental problems. Rather, it is to provide an overview of chronic and war-related environmental issues, and to identify the steps needed to safeguard the environment. Top priorities include environmental issues that have a direct link with easing the humanitarian situation, especially the restoration of water, power, sanitation networks and ensuring food security.
I am delighted to present this report on the assessment of contaminated sites in Iraq. This pioneering work has been conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Environment and its professional experts under the guidance and supervision of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
The project is part of a series of capacity building activities being undertaken by UNEP, with support from the Government of Japan through the UN Iraq Trust Fund. While UNEP has been undertaking post-conflict environmental assessments since 1999, the situation in Iraq posed some unique challenges. Initial field visits by the UNEP team indicated the need to urgently assess the level of contamination at a number of industrial sites. However, the security situation did not permit UN staff to work inside the country.
UNEP therefore developed a specific approach to assess the contaminated sites using a team of Iraqi experts from various Ministries that were selected and trained by UNEP experts to undertake the work. The data gathered inside Iraq was supplemented with satellite imagery,
and samples were analysed in international laboratories. All of the field work was documented in great detail using global positioning systems and digital cameras. The outcomes of the work highlight a number of important findings and lessons. First and foremost, the report demonstrates that while there are contaminated sites in Iraq, the environmental risks are still very localised and the opportunity exists to initiate immediate clean-up before public health is threatened. Urgent action should be taken as soon as possible to contain the large quantities of toxic chemicals lying unattended and unguarded. In this regard, I am extremely pleased that the findings of this project have resulted in UNEP being awarded additional financial resources by the UN Iraq Trust Fund to initiate clean-up activities. Throughout this work, UNEP has also learned that an approach based on remote supervision, modern communications equipment and remote sensing can produce very useful results even in conditions where the United Nations cannot be present on the ground. This vastly expands the operating envelope for future UNEP interventions in other parts of the world.
This working paper deals with the nexus of diaspora communities living in European host countries, specifically in Germany, and the transformation of protracted violent conflicts in a number of home countries, including Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Somalia and Afghanistan. Firstly, the political and social role and importance of diaspora communities vis-à-vis their home and host countries is discussed, given the fact that the majority of immigrants to Germany, as well as to many other European countries, over the last ten years have come from countries with protracted civil wars and have thus had to apply for refugee or asylum status. One guiding question, then, is to what extent these groups can contribute politically and economically to supporting conflict transformation in their countries of origin. Secondly, the role and potentials of diaspora communities originating from countries with protracted violent conflicts for fostering conflict transformation activities are outlined. Thirdly, the current conflict situation in Sri Lanka is analyzed and a detailed overview of the structures and key organizations of the Tamil and Sinhalese diaspora worldwide is given. The structural potentials and levels for constructive intervention for working on conflict in Sri Lanka through the diasporas are then described. Fourthly, the socio-political roles of diaspora communities originating from Cyprus, Palestine, Somalia and Afghanistan for peacebuilding and rehabilitation in their home countries are discussed. The article finishes by drawing two conclusions. Firstly, it recommends the further development of domestic migration policies in Europe in light of current global challenges. Secondly, it points out that changes in foreign and development policies are crucial to make better use of the immense potential of diaspora communities for conflict transformation initiatives and development activities in their home countries.
In this essay, we first identify the ways in which women’s interests are disregarded and sacrificed as peace agreements are reached, criminal courts and tribunals are established, and relief efforts are planned. Incorporating reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the UN, and news accounts, we assess the ethical problems with what might be called a ‘‘perpetrator-centered’’ approach to coping with conflict’s aftermath that exacerbates and prolongs women’s suffering. Not only do conventional trial procedures dismiss the victims’ trauma and needs as secondary to the process of adjudicating the question of the perpetrator’s guilt, but many also privilege the right of the accused to confront and question the victims over the additional suffering the victims must endure in giving testimony. After delineating the gendered effects of conflict, we then study the operation of compensation boards following recent conflicts. Even in those instances in which rape has been specifically identified and prosecuted as a war crime, existing structures fail to provide significant relief to female victims, as they neglect the underlying social, cultural, and economic practices that reinforce patriarchal systems, and thus hold women accountable for their own victimization; the traditional legalistic models that are typically employed in peace settlements and tribunals simply fail to meet the needs of the victims. Finally, in response to the limitations of peace agreements and tribunals in addressing human suffering, we identify an alternative model for conducting such negotiations and for securing restitution to the victims of wartime abuses and their effects—a ‘‘victim-centered’’ approach to war crimes adjudication and compensation procedures.
This comment presents a three-part analysis that ultimately critiques and redefines occupation law to prevent a repetition of the failures that transpired in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Section One lays out the fundamental provisions of the conservative laws of occupation as embodied in the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions as well as the U.S. Army Field Manual. It also discusses the growing trend towards humanitarian intervention and the need for transformative occupation to ensure a successfully stable post- war state. Section Two uses the tenets of occupation law as outlined in Section One to describe the dire consequences of the Coalition’s breach of this body of law, through its actions that revamped the administrative, political, economic, and legal structures of the state. Section Three uses the analysis of Section Two to demonstrate that the conservative laws of occupation are inadequate and need to be redefined. This Section lays out the “exceptional” circumstances for a non-U.N. mandated intervention. It then proposes a revision to occupation law that seeks to incorporate human rights law, as well as additional considerations derived from post- war Iraq, to formulate a modified and modernized legal regime “under a new umbrella labeled jus post bellum.”
This article analyses which of the major lessons learned from previous experiences in nation building have been applied or ignored in Iraq. It focuses on the first six months of the post-combat period, a time frame generally recognised as being critical for laying the foundations for a stable and democratic future. A review of previous cases points to six lessons that, in fact, have been unlearned, and only two that have been realised in this initial phase in Iraq.
Timely and pathbreaking, Securing the Peace is the first book to explore the complete spectrum of civil war terminations, including negotiated settlements, military victories by governments and rebels, and stalemates and ceasefires. Examining the outcomes of all civil war terminations since 1940, Monica Toft develops a general theory of postwar stability, showing how third-party guarantees may not be the best option. She demonstrates that thorough security-sector reform plays a critical role in establishing peace over the long term. Much of the thinking in this area has centered on third parties presiding over the maintenance of negotiated settlements, but the problem with this focus is that fewer than a quarter of recent civil wars have ended this way. Furthermore, these settlements have been precarious, often resulting in a recurrence of war. Toft finds that military victory, especially victory by rebels, lends itself to a more durable peace. She argues for the importance of the security sector–the police and military–and explains that victories are more stable when governments can maintain order. Toft presents statistical evaluations and in-depth case studies that include El Salvador, Sudan, and Uganda to reveal that where the security sector remains robust, stability and democracy are likely to follow. An original and thoughtful reassessment of civil war terminations, Securing the Peace will interest all those concerned about resolving our world’s most pressing conflicts.
The Iraq war was a multiple assault on the foundations and rules of the existing UN-centred world order. It called into question the adequacy of the existing institutions for articulating global norms and enforcing compliance with the demands of the international community. It was simultaneously a test of the UN’s willingness and ability to deal with brutal dictatorships and a searching scrutiny of the nature and exercise of American power. The United States has global power, soft as well as hard; the United Nations is the fount of international authority. Progress towards a world of a rules-based, civilized international order requires that US force be put to the service of lawful international authority. This book examines these major normative and structural challenges from a number of different perspectives.
Following years of authoritarian rule and economic sanctions, the United States and the international community agreed in the spring of 2003 that efforts should be made to rehabilitate economic infrastructure and introduce representative government to post-war Iraq, among other objectives. To meet these ends, a large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This program, funded through a mix of appropriations accounts, is undergoing increased scrutiny in the 110th Congress. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort and key issues of potential interest to Congress.
Over the past two decades, people have seen considerable progress made in international conflict management, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The end of the Cold War has led to the obsolescence of war between major powers, and globalization has increased the interconnectedness and interdependence among people, societies, and countries. However, the longevity and large-scale nature of armed conflicts in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Chad, and Sudan with enormous humanitarian consequences are solemn reminders that international institutions and peacekeeping actions are still unable to meet global challenges with global responses. Here, Tanner addresses the perils of peace operations toward global peacekeeping system. He also cites the important progress that peacekeeping has made over the past twenty years and explores, in view of a continuous North-South divide and a resurging Westphalian bias, what such a global peacekeeping system could look like.
A window of opportunity now exists for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq despite the resurgence of violence in the spring of 2008. The creation of Sunni Awakening Councils, the ongoing presence of sufficient U.S. troops, and the decrease in combat activity by the Mahdi Army provide a real, though tenuous, opportunity to continue building on the gains of the past year…In all societies emerging from conflict, reconciliation efforts are the glue that holds the post-conflict reconstruction process together. Reconciliation must be pursued not only on national but also on local levels and not only in the political but also in the social domain. At all points within a society, people and groups must be encouraged to work together constructively for the common good. Reconciliation in Iraq must be approached with sensitivity to its shame-oriented culture, which emphasizes community, authority, honor, and hospitality. Reconciliation must also be approached with an awareness of the importance of primary identity markers-religion, ethnicity, tribe, and family-and the possibilities for creating bonds based on secondary markers-class, profession, internally displaced persons (IDP) status, and so forth.
Based on the study of every internationally negotiated civil war settlement between 1980 and 1998, this volume presents the most comprehensive effort to date to evaluate the role of international actors in peace implementation. It looks into promises made by combatants in peace agreements and examines when and why those promises are fulfilled. The authors differentiate between conflicts, showing why Guatemala is not Bosnia, and why strategies that succeed in benign environments fail in more challenging ones. Going beyond attributing implementation failures to a lack of political will, the volume argues that an absence of political will reflects the judgment of major powers of the absence of vital security interests. Overall, the authors emphasize that implementers must tailor their strategies and give priority to certain tasks in implementation, such as demobilizing soldiers and demilitarizing politics, to achieve success.
How can the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations, government donors, and other policymakers best apply the tools of conflict prevention to the wide range of intrastate conflict situations actually found in the field? The detailed case studies and analytical chapters in this book offer operational lessons for fashioning strategy and tactics to meet the challenges of specific conflicts, both potential and actual. The cases included are Burundi, Colombia, East Timor, Fiji, Georgia, Kenya, Liberia, Tajikistan, and Tanzania/Zanzibar.
This article surveys recent cases of internationalized statebuilding in postintervention, post–(ethnic) conflict societies in the light of an academic tradition that has seen military forces as a particularly effective vehicle for integrating a country’s diverse population. It is argued that armed forces that are ethnically representative in their ranks and leadership can encourage a sense of commonality across ethnic boundaries, which can help secure a fragile peace. However, the connection between representativeness and integration is intricate; and whereas outside powers may enable otherwise unlikely outcomes, their leverage is circumscribed by a number of factors. The article also suggests that an ethnically representative army may “tie up” capabilities in ways that reduce the likelihood of military intervention in politics or (ethnic) violence perpetrated by military personnel.
The future of the properties of the 210,000 internally displaced people who had to leave their properties beginning with the first inter-communal strife in 1964 is one of the most difficult issues of the new set of peace negotiations which began in Cyprus in 2008. After giving a brief historical account of the displacements—how they were managed and perceived on both sides of the island—this article studies the property issue with a specific focus on the management of the IDP properties. Moreover, analysing the problems mainly via reactions to the Annan Plan, the article underlines three issues of security, economics and justice as the keys to comprehend the essence of the problems of property and IDP return, finally making the claim that there is a need to separate the question of IDP return and return of property rights.
A tense relationship has marked decades of interaction between Arab regimes and their civil societies in the areas of human rights, democracy, governance reform, justice and reconciliation. While the role of civil society in development, humanitarian and environmental issues has generally been tolerated more easily by Arab governments, the same cannot be said for the areas just mentioned. In recent years there has been greater awareness of the increasing importance of civil society in assisting governments to push forward the wheel of development. There exists, though, no clear assessment of the role of civil society in reform movements or the degree and seriousness of their involvement to date. This article aims to contribute to closing this gap by exploring crucial civil society functions – strengthening civic engagement and community-empowerment – in the specific context of the Arab world, and by introducing the work of a number of organisations in this region. The next section briefly discusses the role of Arab civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs and explains some of their functions. Section three reflects on traditional conflict resolution and reconciliation methods and their relation to the “Western field” of conflict resolution. Section four presents cases from Lebanon and Morocco, looking at concrete projects, objectives and achievements of organisations, while section five discusses common challenges. The final section identifies possible next steps in light of the current political developments in the region.
This study is about role of the media within conflict-torn societies and its potential as a tool for conflict transformation. The author takes a post-modern approach and uses Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse as an analytical frame for evaluation. His study centers on local radio in Palestine.
This article uses a case-study of Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to address the planning and management processes and institutions required to make effective use of international resources. The importance of this perspective is underlined by an influential recent report to the United Nations which noted: ‘While there is a tendency to blame the limited success rate [of peacebuilding missions] on lack of resources, it is equally possible that the main problem is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available.
International school textbook revision and research became a professional academic activity after the First World War. It broadened its scope and methodological approaches considerably after the collapse of the bipolar world. Today, a number of different agencies, such as international governmental institutions, NGOs, and academic as well as pedagogical institutions, are involved in projects on the revision of history teaching in postconflict societies. This article examines the pros and cons of different project designs, focusing on the sometimes contradictory aims projects are expected to achieve and on the interplay between the various agencies. Examples highlighting the reconstruction and reconciliation process are taken from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Israel-Palestine, and Rwanda and South Africa.
The United States has consistently failed to deal with the breakdown in public order that invariably confronts peace and stability operations in internal conflicts. Analysis of experience in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and Iraq demonstrates that indigenous police forces are typically incapable of providing law and order in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and so international forces must fill the gap – a task the US military has been unwilling and unprepared to assume. After 20 years of lessons learned (and not learned), this article argues that the United States must develop a civilian ‘stability force’ of constabulary and police personnel deployable at the outset of on operation to restore public order and lay the foundations for the rule of law.
Effective peacebuilding in the aftermath of civil war usually requires the drastic reform of security institutions, a process frequently known as security sector reform. Nearly every major donor, as well as a growing number of international organizations, supports the reform of security organizations in countries emerging from conflict and suffering high levels of violence. But how are reform strategies implemented? This collection of case studies (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Timor-Leste, Mozambique, Serbia, Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, Jamaica) examines the strategies, methods, and practices of the policymakers and practitioners engaged in security sector reform, uncovering the profound conceptual and practical challenges encountered in transforming policy aspiration into practice.
This article places the Iraqi National Conference of August 2004 in a comparative context by examining the role of national conferences in transitional and post-conflict countries. It argues that national conferences do not contribute significantly to a transitional process, if a prior political agreement on the process and on the role of the Conference among key stakeholders is absent. In Iraq, the disagreement over the transitional framework created by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council impeded a truly inclusive Conference from taking place. A core of established political parties, distrusted by the opposition, controlled the Conference preparations. A transparent preparatory process did not take place; the Conference did not serve as a forum for genuine dialogue. Finally, the National Council elected by the Conference did not expand political participation to credible opposition figures.
This paper examines transition patterns in post-Gulf war Iraqi Kurdistan as a function of external aid, and the impact of these developments on relations between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad. It argues that, despite ethnic traditions and structural legacies, the asymmetrical and changing nature of aid has created new incentives for conflict and co-operation. Since 1991 aid has strengthened the Kurdistan region’s power in relation to the state and increased leverage on the central government to accommodate Kurdish demands for autonomy. Yet it has also created an increasingly complex political,?economic order and new interdependencies between the regions. The shift from relief aid to reconstruction within a neoliberal framework has helped open the Iraqi and Kurdish political economies by encouraging trade between the Kurdistan region, regional states and foreign governments. The creation of a federal Iraqi state has also led to financial and political linkages between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad and to new requirements for negotiation.
The African Union (AU) was officially inaugurated on July 2002, and a year later it had already deployed its first peace operation in Burundi. The AU subsequently deployed peacekeeping missions in Darfur, in 2004, and in Somalia, in 2007. This article will examine the AU‘s foray into peacekeeping which appears to have been hasty, erratic, and not carefully planned. The article will also assess the extent to which what the AU has been doing can be defined as peacekeeping using the Brahimi Criterion for the deployment of operations. The article will briefly assess the AU‘s operations in Burundi and Somalia before focusing on the joint AU-United Nations (UN) hybrid mission in Darfur. The article examine whether the hybrid mission represents a paradigm shift in peacekeeping, based on the way that it was launched and how it is currently operated. The article examines whether the hybrid mission fulfils the Brahimi Criterion, and whether it can serve as a model for future peacekeeping operations in Africa. The article concludes that the AU has a better chance of success when it undertakes a concise and focused operation with a clear mandate and the modicum of logistics to ensure its effective implementation, as demonstrated by its experiences in Burundi. The AU‘s efforts in Somalia has left it mired in an open-ended complex emergency with no easy remedy. The organisation‘s joint effort with the UN in Darfur is similarly constrained by the absence of a peace to keep. The hybrid mission therefore falls short of the Brahimi Criterion and suggest that UN intervention following an initial AU peace operation is not necessarily a panacea to the continent‘s peacekeeping challenges.
This book provides a critical analysis of the changing discourse and practice of post-conflict security-promoting interventions since the Cold War, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and security-sector reform (SSR). Although the international aid and security sectors exhibit an expanding appetite for peace-support operations in the 21st Century, the effectiveness of such interventions are largely untested. This book aims to fill this evidentiary gap and issues a challenge to ‘conventional’ approaches to security promotion as currently conceived by military and peace-keeping forces, drawing on cutting-edge statistical and qualitative findings from war-torn areas including Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Sudan, Uganda, Colombia and Haiti. By focusing on specific cases where the United Nations and others have sought to contain the (presumed) sources of post-conflict violence and insecurity, it lays out a new research agenda for measuring success or failure.
This report describes how the Iraq war and its aftermath continue to have a disastrous impact on the physical and mental health of the Iraqi people, and the urgent measures needed to improve health and health services. It focuses on the many failures of the occupying forces and their governments to protect health, or to facilitate the rebuilding of a health system based on primary health care principles. It assesses the current state of the health system, including the impact of insecurity, and the workforce, supplies, medicines and equipment it lacks. It also looks at health information and health policy. There is a special focus on mental health care, a particularly neglected area. The report ends with conclusions and recommendations, exploring what needs to happen now in Iraq and what lessons can be learned.
The post-Cold War has witnessed enormous levels of western peacekeeping, peacemaking and reconstruction intervention in societies emerging from war. These western-led interventions are often called ‘liberal peacebuilding’ or ‘liberal interventionism’, or statebuilding, and have attracted considerable controversy. In this study, leading proponents and critics of the liberal peace and contemporary post-war reconstruction assess the role of the United States, European Union and other actors in the promotion of the liberal peace, and of peace more generally. Key issues, including transitional justice and the acceptance/rejection of the liberal peace in African states are also considered. The failings of the liberal peace (most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in other locations) have prompted a growing body of critical literature on the motivations, mechanics and consequences of the liberal peace. This volume brings together key protagonists from both sides of the debate to produce a cutting edge, state of the art discussion of one the main trends in contemporary international relations.
This text provides a glimpse into the research-workings of a project entitled ‘Conflict Cultures and Intercultural Mediation’, based at the Berghof Research Center. It covers findings resulting from the pilot phase of the project, which came to an end in September 1995, and it can therefore only do partial justice to the range of expectations aroused by its title. The aim has been to bring home to the reader, working as closely as possible to the analysed material, just how difficult a form of intercession intercultural mediation is.
In the literature on post-conflict reconstruction, the intervention in Iraq has been understood as an exception to, if not an aberration from, contemporary state-building. This article argues that whether Iraq is an exception to, or the epitome of post-conflict reconstruction depends on the genealogy one attributes to the latter. Denying that Iraq is an exemplary instance of contemporary reconstruction means neglecting the continuities of state-building from interwar trusteeship via Germany and Vietnam to the contemporary reproduction of the neoliberal model continuities which the example of Iraq exposes more clearly than prior cases. An outline of the genealogy of state-building and an analysis of Iraqi reconstruction both point to the reproduction of a hegemonic international order as the rationale of statebuilding now and then.
After the Abu Ghraib abuse became public, Congress and the world decried the actions of the military police, resulting in the prosecution of several military personnel. The military police, however, had accomplices in the abuse. Private military contractors accounted for one-third of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Yet, none of those private military contractors ever faced criminal prosecution for their role in the abuse. The lack of prosecution gave way to a mad scramble. Congress, lawyers, and law students introduced solutions on how to bring private military contractors to justice. Nonetheless, private military contractors continue to commit crimes without any criminal prosecution. This lack of prosecution came to light again after a September 16, 2007 incident in which contractors for Blackwater allegedly fired at innocent Iraqi civilians. The incident angered the Iraqi government and the House of Representatives went on yet another mad scramble to ensure that, in the future, private military contractors will face criminal prosecution. Part II of this article describes the impetus behind the initial mad scramble after Abu Ghraib. Part III analyzes the congressional solution that resulted from the initial mad scramble, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”). Part III also discusses reasons why MEJA will fail to withstand judicial scrutiny and argues that further congressional response will suffer the same fate. Part IV describes the other congressional solution, court-martial, and why it also fails as a viable solution. Part V analyzes the other proposed solutions to bring private military contractors to justice and describes why they will not work. Part VI discusses a proposed solution that addresses the shortcomings of current congressional approaches.
The Administration is claiming success in significantly reducing violence in Iraq to the point where additional U.S. troop reductions can be considered, attributing the gains to a “troop surge” announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 (“New Way Forward”). With the 28,500 “surge” forces withdrawn as of July 2008, Defense Department reports assess that overall violence is down as much as 80% since early 2007, to levels not seen since 2004, but that progress can be “fragile and tenuous” if not accompanied by fundamental political reconciliation and economic development. The Administration believes that additional “conditions-based” reductions in U.S. forces, continued building of Iraq’s security forces, and likely further political progress in Iraq – is likely to produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. The Administration argues that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is increasingly recognized as capable, and that Iraqi legislative action in Iraq since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that was envisioned would be facilitated by the surge.
The common refrain that the surge has produced military success that has not been matched by political progress fundamentally misrepresents the nature of Iraq’s political evolution. The increased security achieved over the last two years has been purchased through a number of choices that have worked against achieving meaningful political reconciliation. The reductions in violence in 2007 and 2008 have, in fact, made true political accommodation in Iraq more elusive, contrary to the central theory of the surge. Rather than advancing Iraq’s political transition and facilitating power-sharing deals among Iraq’s factions, the surge has produced an oil revenue-fueled, Shia-dominated national government with close ties to Iran. This national government shows few signs of seeking to compromise and share meaningful power with other frustrated political factions. The surge has set up a political house of cards. But this does not mean that the U.S. military must stay longer to avoid its collapse. Quite the contrary: Without a U.S. military drawdown, Iraq will not be able to achieve the true internal consolidation of power necessary to advance U.S. security interests in the Middle East. Iraq will need to overcome numerous hurdles in its political transition before the end of 2009, including two elections and a long list of unresolved power-sharing questions. Not all of the 10 key challenges outlined in this report are of equal magnitude-failure to resolve some would likely lead to major, systemic crisis, while failure on others would simply be suboptimal. Yet all are interconnected, and none have been resolved by the security improvements of the last 18 months or will be meaningfully addressed simply by postponing U.S. troop withdrawals.
The DDR process that took place in Lebanon after the internal wars (1975-89), based on the Ta’if Accord (1989), was not co-ordinated by any international organisation. This paper assesses the reintegration of a number of combatants of one of the militias, the Lebanese Forces, placing particular emphasis on the context in which it unfolded. A programme of reintegration into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was proposed to the ex-combatants, but because of the high number on one side and because of the situation within the LAF itself (a pluri-religious organisation under reorganisation) this programme had little effect on the process. Instead the majority of the ex-combatants came to rely on their family and network established within the militia for their social and economic reintegration. This study finds that there has been little rupture between life as combatants and life as civilians. Three contextual factors were particularly important: the small size of the country, the rhythm of the war where periods of combat alternated with periods of calm, and the close contact combatants managed to keep with their family, work, schools and universities. A key lesson for DDR processes more generally stems from the study: DDR initiatives are likely to be most effective when they work alongside and augment indigenous positive social processes contributing to reintegration.
This paper argues that gender issues are becoming politicised in novel and counterproductive ways in contexts where armed interventions usher in new blueprints for governance and democratisation. Using illustrations from constitutional and electoral processes in Afghanistan and Iraq, it analyses how the nature of emerging political settlements in environments of high risk and insecurity may jeopardise stated international commitments to a women’s rights agenda. The disjuncture between stated aims and observed outcomes becomes particularly acute in contexts where security and the rule of law are severely compromised, where Islam becomes a stake in power struggles among contending factions and where ethnic/sectarian constituencies are locked in struggles of representation in defence of their collective rights.
This study contains the results of research on reconstructing internal security institutions during nation-building missions. It analyzes the activities of the United States and other countries in building viable police, internal security forces, and justice structures. This study examines in detail the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, three of the most important instances in the post-Cold War era in which the United States and its allies have attempted to reconstruct security institutions. It then compares these cases with six others in the post-Cold War era: Panama, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and East Timor. Finally, the study draws conclusions from the case studies and analysis, and derives recommendations to help the United States and other international actors improve their performance in the delivery of post-conflict security. The results should be of interest to a broad audience of policymakers and academics concerned with the successes and shortcomings of past security efforts. Although the study is not intended to be a detailed analysis of U.S. or allied military doctrine regarding stability operations, we believe it provides a useful set of guidelines and recommendations for a wide range of military, civilian, and other practitioners.
We define nation-building as efforts carried out after major combat to underpin a transition to peace and democracy. Nationbuilding involves the deployment of military forces, as well as comprehensive efforts to rebuild the health, security, economic, political, and other sectors. The research we conducted focused on one aspect of nation-building-efforts to rebuild the public health and health care delivery systems after major combat. We looked at seven cases- Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These are some of the most important cases since World War II in which international institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and countries such as the United States have taken part in efforts to rebuild the health sector. These missions also have important health components. To date, a significant amount of academic and policy-relevant work has been devoted to efforts to rebuild such areas as police and military forces. Little comprehensive work has examined efforts to rebuild public health and health care delivery systems, however. The work that has been done on health tends to focus on immediate humanitarian and relief efforts rather than long-term health reconstruction. The goal of our research was to fill this void.
The long-running conflict over the sovereignty of Western Sahara has involved all the states of northwest Africa and many beyond since Spain ceded the territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1976. Erik Jensen traces the evolution of the conflict-from its colonial roots to its present manifestation as a political stalemate. Jensen reviews the history of the dispute, describes the quest by the UN and interested states to facilitate a process of self-determination through a referendum on independence versus integration with Morocco, and explores the impasse over how to determine who should be allowed to vote in such a referendum. He then turns to the more recent efforts of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s personal envoy for Western Sahara, James Baker, to resolve the conflict. Despite Baker’s 2003 peace plan, the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front remain at odds, and the stalemate continues.
This concise volume examines the cultural, sociopolitical, economic, and geographic facets of the prolonged hostilities that have embroiled Sudan since its independence. With great care, the authors address both the internal grievances that fuel the current conflict in Darfur, and the failure of regional and international actors to fully come to terms with the complexities of the issues involved.
Post-conflict cities represent a laboratory in which to explore the substate orientation of security. Based on an analysis of developments in Baghdad, Basra and Falluja since 2003, this article argues not only that security is inherently selective, but also that the exclusionary actions of local or sectarian groups are more influential than those of statebased agents or projects based on security for the individual. The notion of security can accommodate multiple interpretations, but in practice a dominant discourse controls its meaning, and negotiation soon develops into patterns of domination and exclusion. This typically leads to a ‘ghettoization’ of security, whereby specific groups are secure only in specific areas. Security thus reflects the sum of myriad local arrangements. The key issue, therefore, is not whether there can be security for all, but the nature of the concessions made by substate and state-based types of security, and the contrast between them and models based on security for the individual.
In a sweeping review of forty truth commissions, Priscilla Hayner delivers a definitive exploration of the global experience in official truth-seeking after widespread atrocities. When Unspeakable Truths was first published in 2001, it quickly became a classic, helping to define the field of truth commissions and the broader arena of transitional justice. This second edition is fully updated and expanded, covering twenty new commissions formed in the last ten years, analyzing new trends, and offering detailed charts that assess the impact of truth commissions and provide comparative information not previously available. Placing the increasing number of truth commissions within the broader expansion in transitional justice, Unspeakable Truths surveys key developments and new thinking in reparations, international justice, healing from trauma, and other areas. The book challenges many widely-held assumptions, based on hundreds of interviews and a sweeping review of the literature. This book will help to define how these issues are addressed in the future.
One of the most important psychological barriers to conflict resolution is the rigid structure of the sociopsychological repertoire that evolves in societies immersed in intractable conflict. This article examines ways to overcome the rigidity of this repertoire in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, in line with the prospect theory, the authors assumed that elicitation of beliefs about losses stemming from the continuing conflict may bring about a process of unfreezing. To test this assumption, an exploratory study with a national sample of the Israeli-Jewish population and two subsequent experimental studies were conducted. The results demonstrated that exposure to information about losses inherent in continuing the conflict induces higher willingness to acquire new information about possible solutions to the conflict, higher willingness to reevaluate current positions about it, and more support for compromises than the exposure to neutral information or to information about possible gains derived from the peace agreement.
This book examines the role of multiethnic armies in post-conflict reconstruction, and demonstrates how they can promote peacebuilding efforts. The author challenges the assumption that multiethnic composition leads to weakness of the military, and shows how a multiethnic army is frequently the impetus for peacemaking in multiethnic societies. Three case studies (Nigeria, Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina) determine that rather than external factors, it is the internal structures that make or break the military institution in a socially challenging environment. The book finds that where the political will is present, the multiethnic military can become a symbol of reconciliation and coexistence. Furthermore, it shows that the military as a professional identity can supersede ethnic considerations and thus facilitates cooperation within the armed forces despite a hostile post-conflict setting. In this, the book challenges widespread theories about ethnic identities and puts professional identities on an equal footing with them.
Fukuyama brings together esteemed academics, political analysts, and practitioners to reflect on the U.S. experience with nation-building, from its historical underpinnings to its modern-day consequences. The United States has sought on repeated occasions to reconstruct states damaged by conflict, from Reconstruction in the South after the Civil War to Japan and Germany after World War II, to the ongoing rebuilding of Iraq. Despite this rich experience, there has been remarkably little systematic effort to learn lessons on how outside powers can assist in the building of strong and self-sufficient states in post-conflict situations. The contributors dissect mistakes, false starts, and lessons learned from the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq within the broader context of reconstruction efforts in other parts of the world, including Latin America, Japan, and the Balkans. Examining the contrasting models in Afghanistan and Iraq, they highlight the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq as a cautionary example of inadequate planning.
On September 16, 2007, a team of security contractors from Blackwater Worldwide shot dead seventeen Iraqi civilians while escorting American diplomats through central Baghdad. The fallout was swift and farreaching. Iraq demanded that Blackwater cease operating in the country. Its parliament introduced legislation to revoke the blanket immunity granted to contractors in the early days of the war by the American administrators who governed Iraq. Within a week, family members of the victims had filed a lawsuit in U.S. court, the FBI had launched an investigation and warned of criminal charges, and the House Government Reform Committee had issued a withering report on security contractors’ transgressions. Soon after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, military commanders, academics, and Iraqi officials have warned of insufficient oversight and accountability for the private contractors operating there. Deployed in unprecedented numbers, contractors have been implicated in a range of alleged crimes and human rights violations. So far, however, not a single contractor has been successfully prosecuted for violence perpetrated in Iraq. Furthermore, no contractor or company has been held liable for torts committed there. Attempts at self-regulation by the industry have also proven ineffective. Recent months have seen wide-ranging attempts to bring accountability to the industry. This recent development will explain these efforts, which include legislative initiatives, criminal charges against individual contractors, and attempts by private litigants to secure judgments for money damages. Because of the enormous body of literature on the topic of private military contractors, the analysis will focus narrowly on the issue raised by the September shootings–the various punishments and remedies available under both civilian and military law for harms done by American contractors to Iraqi civilians.
This report analyzes the political dimensions of Iraqi displacement, beginning with a short description of the present situation and its historical background. It then analyzes the implications of the large-scale internal displacement on the security of both Iraq and its two neighbors who host the largest number of Iraqi refugees. A discussion of U.S. policy, European concerns, and the response of the United Nations is followed by analysis of returns of the displaced, with particular attention to the burning issue of property compensation. The study concludes with recommendations to the U.S. government and to the broader international community.
This article compares Britain’s failed attempt at building a stable, liberal state in Iraq from 1914 to 1932 with the USA’s struggle to stabilise the country after regime change in April 2003. It sets out a template for endogenous state-building based on the evolution of the European state system. It then compares this to exogenous extra-European state-building after both World War I and the Cold War. It focuses on three key stages: the imposition of order, the move from coercive to administrative capacity and finally the evolution of a collective civic identity linked to the state. It is this process against which Iraqi state-building by the British in the 1920s and by the USA from 2003 onwards can be accurately judged to have failed. For both the British and American occupations, troop numbers were one of the central problems undermining the stability of Iraq. British colonial officials never had the resources to transform the despotic power deployed by the state into sustainable infrastructural capacity. Instead they relied on hakumat al tayarra (government by aircraft). The dependence upon air power led to the neglect of other state institutions, stunting the growth of infrastructural power and hence state legitimacy. The US occupation has never managed to impose despotic power, having failed to obtain a monopoly over the collective deployment of violence. Instead it has relied on ‘indigenisation,’ the hurried creation of a new Iraqi army. The result has been the security vacuum that dominates the south and centre of the country. The article concludes by suggesting that unsuccessful military occupations usually end after a change of government in the intervening country. This was the case for the British in May 1929 and may well be the case for the USA after the next presidential election in 2008.
The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies – Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan – and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.
This study contains the results of research on best practices in nationbuilding. It is intended to complement a companion volume, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, which focuses on U.S.-led nationbuilding efforts. Its purpose is to analyze United Nations military, political, humanitarian, and economic activities in post-conflict situations since World War II, determine key principles for success, and draw implications for future nation-building missions. The study contains the lessons learned from eight UN cases: Belgian Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. It also examines the nationbuilding effort in Iraq.
In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. The current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.
The victories that Iraqi and Coalition forces have won to date may have largely dealt with the “win” aspects of a “win, hold, and build” strategy, but this is only part of the story. The future of Iraq’s security forces, and Iraq’s future security and stability, will depend on how well the force development effort is supported by political accommodation and effective governance at the national, province, and local level. Progress here is necessary not only to consolidate the gains made against AQI and the JAM, but it is critical to both avoiding new forms of sectarian and ethnic conflict, and to giving the ISF the mix of civilian partners that allows Iraq to “build and hold”as well as to win. Conditions-based US withdrawals need to be tied to these developments as well as to the progress in developing the Iraqi security forces.
The intensity and complexity of post-war violence routinely exceeds expectations. Many development and security specialists fear that, if left unchecked, mutating violence can potentially tip ‘fragile’ societies back into war. An array of ‘conventional’ security promotion activities are regularly advanced to prevent this from happening, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and other forms of security sector reform (SSR). Meanwhile, a host of less widely recognised examples of security promotion activities are emerging that deviate from – and also potentially reinforce – DDR and SSR. Innovation and experimentation by mediators and practitioners has yielded a range of promising activities designed to mitigate the risks and symptoms of post-war violence including interim stabilisation measures and second generation security promotion interventions. Drawing on original evidence, this article considers a number of critical determinants of post-war violence that potentially shape the character and effectiveness of security promotion on the ground. It then issues a typology of security promotion practices occurring before, during and after more conventional interventions such as DDR and SSR. Taken together, the identification of alternative approaches to security promotion implies a challenging new research agenda for the growing field of security and development.
The U.S. military and its allies were poorly prepared to undertake post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, operations were not as efficient or as effective as they could have been…Part of the problem, both historical and current, in conducting post-conflict operations is a lack of historical memory, which can lead to unrealistic expectations on the part of the military and the public…If the U.S. and its allies wish to meet future challenges more effectively, they will have to provide innovations in education, operational practices, acquisition, and organization. Combined, these could provide the impetus for developing an appropriate post-conflict force for future occupations.
There is increasing consensus among scholars and policy analysts that successful peacebuilding can occur only in the context of capable state institutions. But how can legitimate and sustainable states best be established in the aftermath of civil wars? And what role should international actors play in supporting the vital process? Addressing these questions, this state-of-the-art volume explores the core challenges involved in institutionalizing postconflict states. The combination of thematic chapters and in-depth case studies covers the full range of the most vexing and diverse problems confronting domestic and international actors seeking to build states while building peace. Case studies include: Somalia, Palestine, Bosnia, East Timor / Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Liberia
This book addresses what both scholars and practitioners now recognize as a foundation of effective peace: effective, legitimate, and rights-respecting systems of justice and physical security. This volume provides nine case studies by distinguished contributors, including scholars, criminal justice practitioners, and former senior officials of international missions, most of whom have closely followed or been intimately involved in these processes. The wide-ranging case studies address whether and how societies emerging from armed conflict create systems of justice and security that ensure basic rights, apply the law effectively and impartially, and enjoy popular support. The studies examine the importance of social, economic, and cultural factors as well as institutional choices regarging the form, substance, and sequence of reforms. Cases include: El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, South Africa, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor / Timor Leste. Additional Topic: Gender.
On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, President G.W. Bush argued that if setting up democracy in Japan and Germany after WW II was successful, then it should also be successful in Iraq. This book provides a detailed comparison of the reconstruction of Japan from 1945 to 1952 with the current reconstruction of Iraq, evaluating the key factors affecting the success or failure of such projects. The book seeks to understand why American officials believed that extensive social reengineering aiming at seeding democracy and economic development is replicable, through identifying factors explaining the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects. The analysis reveals that in addition to the effective use of material resources of power, the outcome of reconstruction projects depends on a variety of other intertwined factors, and Bridoux provides a new analytical framework relying on a Gramscian concept of power to develop a greater understanding of these factors, and the ultimate success or failure of these reconstruction projects.
The crucial role women can—and should—play in Iraqi reconstruction was the focus of a forum on April 21 and 22, 2003 in Washington D.C. “Winning the Peace: Women’s Role in Post-Conflict Iraq” was hosted by the Conflict Prevention and Middle East Projects of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Women Waging Peace, a global initiative of Hunt Alternatives Fund. Twentyfive Iraqi women participated in the meeting—some of them expatriates living in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East, others living in Iraq. Among the participants were: the first woman to be appointed judge in Iraq, the Minister of Reconstruction and Development of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq, and the President of Iraq’s Assyrian Women’s Union. More than 60 experts from non-governmental organizations and key international and U.S. agencies participated in discussions. Hailing the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime and looking to the future, the Iraqi women, who came from different political, ethnic, and religious groups, cited the notable lack of consideration regarding the participation, concerns, rights, and particular needs of the majority of the country’s population—its women. Discussion focused on the inclusion of women in four vital sectors of Iraqi administration: democracy and governance, economic activity, constitutional law and legislation, and civil society. Over the two-day conference, participants reached conclusions regarding the most important ways to integrate women into reconstruction. On the first day of the conference, the Iraqi women met with sector experts and policymakers in working groups to identify the most pressing needs and the most important potential contributions of women in Iraq.
In the aftermath of violent conflict, how do the economic challenges of statebuilding intersect with the political challenges of peacebuilding? How can the international community help lay the fiscal foundations for a sustainable state and a durable peace? In their new edited volume, Peace and the Public Purse, James Boyce, (Director of PERI’s Development, Peacebuilding, & the Environment Program), and Madalene O’Donnell (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations) lift the curtain that often has separated economic policy from peace implementation. Postwar governments face immediate demands for restoration of basic services, jobs, and public security. To raise revenues to meet these pressing needs, they must contend with local powerbrokers who levy their own informal taxes, economic elites determined to retain special privileges and immunities, and a populace skeptical about the state’s ability to deliver services in return for taxes. Drawing on recent experiences in war-torn societies such as Uganda, Cambodia, Bosnia, Guatemala, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Palestine, this book brings to life a key dimension of how peace and states are built.
This book seeks to move the debate on Iraq toward a consideration of how Iraqis, with the help of the international community, can build an inclusive and enduring social contract amongst themselves. The volume analyses the drivers of conflict and outlines the requirements – and obstacles in the way – of a successful peace-building enterprise in a country that has endured domestic upheavals, but also generated threats to international peace and security, for more than a generation. The authors argue that a downward spiral of violence and possible state collapse can be avoided – but that much needs to be done to achieve these aims.
With the proliferation of the U.S. military’s reliance on contractors as a means of supplementing – and not just supplying – the troops on the ground, serious questions have arisen with respect to the legal regime governing the contractors’ conduct. The legal regime that governs those contractors is at best unclear, given the contractors generally fall outside the auspcies of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. My focus is on the accountability of the U.S. government for the actions of their private contractors. In Part II, I discuss the necessity and importantce of a civil right of action in these cases. Part III will examine the era of privatization and rise of the private contractor in the War on Terror. Part IV demonstrates the lack of accountability for U.S.-directed contractor abuse under current law. Finally, in Part V, I examine mechanism for minding the liability gap between the rights of the abused and the liability of those ultimately responsible.
This book looks at the political reintegration of armed groups after civil wars and the challenges of transforming ‘rebel’, ‘insurgent’ or other non-state armed groups into viable political entities. Drawing on eight case studies, the definition of ‘armed groups’ here ranges from militias, paramilitary forces, police units of various kinds to intelligence outfits. Likewise, the definition of ‘political integration’ or ‘re-integration’ has not been restricted to the formation of political parties, but is understood broadly as active participation in politics, policy-making or public debate through parties, newspapers, social organisations, think-tanks, NGOs or public service. The book seeks to locate or contextualise individual cases within their distinctive social, cultural and historical settings. As such it differs from much of the donor-driven literature that has tended to abstract the challenge of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) from their political and historical context, focusing instead on technical or bureaucratic issues raised by the DDR process. Among the issues covered by the volume as a whole, three stand out: first, the role of political settlements in creating legitimate opportunities for erstwhile leaders of armed factions; second, the ability of reintegration programmes to create genuine socio-economic opportunities that can absorb former fighters as functional members of their communities; and third, the processes involved in transforming an entire rebel movement into a viable political party, movement or, more generally, allowing it to participate in political life.
Post-conflict reconstruction theory and practice have advanced considerably over the last few years, yet the U.S. government and the international community still lack forward-leaning, pragmatic, reliable models for measuring progress in post-conflict settings. Efforts to assess progress in Iraq have been lost in the midst of rumors on the one end and overblown lists of achievements on the other. The sources usually relied upon, from media to U.S. governmentgenerated, do not on their own tell a complete story, and often reflect underlying biases or weaknesses. The Iraqi voice has been a key missing ingredient in most discussions and assessments of Iraq’s reconstruction. In this context, we set out to develop a broad-based, data-rich, multidisciplinary model for measuring progress in Iraq that has as its core the Iraqi perspective. This report assesses the readiness of Iraqis to take charge of their country, both in terms of actual progress on the ground in reconstruction efforts and the way Iraqis perceive current events. We blended several popular theories for methodology, diversified our research, and devised a system to evaluate information and progress in a quantifiable way.
This report recommends ten key actions that U.S. policymakers and the United Nations must take before the conflict starts in order to maximize potential for success in the post-conflict phase in Iraq. These recommendations draw on ongoing work by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, a collaborative effort between the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, and reflect lessons learned through first-hand experience with postconflict reconstruction efforts over the past decade.
Although peacebuilders do not operate from a common template, liberal values so define their activities that their efforts can be called “liberal peacebuilding.” Many postconflict operations aspire to create a state that contains the rule of law, markets, and democracy. Growing evidence suggests, however, that liberal peacebuilding is re-creating the conditions of conflict; states emerging from war do not have the necessary institutions or civic culture to absorb the pressures associated with political and market competition. In recognition of these problems and dangers, there is an emerging call for greater attention to the state and institutionalization before liberalization. These critiques, and lessons learned from recent operations, point to an alternative-republican peacebuilding. Drawing from republican political theory, this article argues that the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation can help states after war address the threats to stability that derive from arbitrary power and factional conflict and, in the process, develop some legitimacy. Republican peacebuilding is not only good for postconflict states; it also is appropriate for international peacebuilders, who also can exercise arbitrary power.
The interesting theoretical question about civil war in general is not why it begins (the possible reasons are surely too many to enumerate) or why it stops (all sorts of contingent explanations from simple fatigue to outside force may apply) but why it so often does not resume when it might. We need to comprehend this process of conflict transformation, whereby the conflict either becomes less important or is pursued without using mass violence. Understandably, most analyses and prescriptions for peacemakers focus on relationships between former enemies and attempts to reduce incentives for them to take up arms again. However, a recent analysis of four negotiated settlements of civil wars (Sudan in 1972, Zimbabwe in 1980, Chad in 1987, and Lebanon in 1989) reveals that in all four cases the critical conflict was actually between former allies. The compromises required in negotiated settlements, combined with the other problems of post-civil war societies, make such conflicts likely. In some cases they led to violence; in Zimbabwe and Lebanon conflict again reached the level of civil war. However, the ironic results was that the countries that had experienced the most violence subsequently produced new settlements which essentially confirmed the original ones and appear to be holding. In Sudan, interallied violence was quite low, but the result was that the government changed its policy, the first settlement was undermined, and the original civil war began again. Outsiders should not assume either that wartime cooperation will continue in peace or that `normal’ peacetime behavior will naturally appear of its own accord. Indeed, they should probably anticipate that ad hoc wartime alliances are likely to dissolve with the risk of renewed civil violence.
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the relationship between militaries and humanitarians. Largely conducted in post-conflict environments, CIMIC has become a key characteristic of military operations in the twenty-first century. However, the field is mostly understood through stereotype rather than clear, comprehensive analysis. The range and scope of activities which fall under the wider rubric of CIMIC is huge, as are the number of differing approaches, across situations and national armed forces. This book demonstrates the wide variety of national approaches to CIMIC activities, introducing some theoretical and ethical considerations into a field that has largely been bereft of this type of debate. Containing several case studies of recent CIMIC (in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq) along with theoretical analyses, it will assist scholars, practitioners, and decision-makers become more aware of the ‘state of the art’ in this field.
After the ceasefire, a group of architects and planners from the American University of Beirut formed the Reconstruction Unit to help in the recovery process and in rebuilding the lives of those affected by the 2006 war in Lebanon. Here, a series of case studies documenting the work of the Unit discusses the lessons to be learned from the experiences of Lebanon after the July War, and suggests how those lessons might be applied elsewhere. The cases are diverse in terms of scale, type of intervention, methods, and approaches to the situation on the ground. Critical issues such as community participation, heritage protection, damage assessment and compensation policies, the role of the state, and capacity building are explored and the success and failures assessed.
The increased sophistication of peacekeeping missions has inevitably expanded the roles of all actors in the field particularly the military who have to play law enforcement functions, in addition to their traditional role, until civilian police are deployed. This essay discusses the consequences of the military role as law enforcers in conflict situations. The author proposes the concept of Formed Police Units (FPUs) to close the security gap that arises in these cases.
The authors provide a context for understanding the region’s security dilemmas, highlighting the link between failures of economic development, governance, and democratization on the one hand, and military insecurity and violent conflicts on the other. The role of key regional and external actors in foiling – and sometimes fueling – conflicts is also examined.
Providing adequate protection, antiterrorism (AT) training and, if necessary, personnel recovery for civilian contractors deployed to support U.S. military operations presents significant legal and policy challenges that both the military and civilian contractor companies have yet to fully appreciate, let alone properly institutionalize. In tandem with identifying the legal and policy considerations associated with these issues, this article will also address the matter of civil liability to the parent contracting company should it fail to provide adequate protection, or appropriate AT training, or both, to their civilian employees serving overseas in hostile environments. Due to federally imposed personnel limitations for the armed forces and the need for specialized skills in the modern high-tech military, hundreds of activities once performed by the military are now privatized and outsourced to thousands of civilian contractors. One of the consequences of the global War on Terror is that American and coalition contractors–particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan –are increasingly subjected to kidnappings, torture, and murder by terrorists, criminal elements, and other insurgency forces. Therefore, it is imperative that issues of force protection, AT training, and personnel recovery be fully delineated and the related legal contours be more clearly defined.